摘要：To ensure operational efficiency, promotion and dismissal are employed as unconventional yet commonly used strategies in public crises. This research examines whether these positional incentives, initially designed to improve government efficacy in crisis response, have a spillover effect on civil servants’ public service motivation (PSM). Using a large-scale survey experiment, we investigated how the promise of promotion and the threat of dismissal in public crises influence PSM, and examined the potential moderating role of hierarchical position among 2062 Chinese civil servants. The results reveal that the impact of these incentives on PSM is contingent on hierarchical position: both promotional and dismissal incentives positively affect PSM among civil servants in managerial positions, whereas only promotional incentives positively affect PSM in non-managerial roles. However, these findings may be highly dependent on institutional factors, particularly China’s unique bureaucratic system. Overall, this research provides insights into how positional incentives in public crises influence PSM, and their implications for civil servants’ public service orientations.

作者：Huaxing Liu，Shuang Li

文章来源：Journal of Asian Public Policy ，25 Nov 2025